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point applies to both of these sources (ILO-OECD).
Cross-national unemployment data are notoriously noncomparable. Countries use different definitions: different age groups are involved, different questions are asked in surveys-if surveys are used-and so on. The Monthly Labor Review article represents an effort by a team of labor statisticians to present some meaningful cross-national data. The ILO-OECD sources contain figures which are not comparable with these.
For example, for the United Kingdom the unemployment rate calculated from OECD figures (according to the instructions Hibbs gave in his letter) works out to be 1.6 percent for 1960-69. The Monthly Labor Review gives 2.9 percent for the same period. Obviously the two sources are not supplying comparable data. Numbers called the same thing (e.g., "unemployment") do not necessarily mean the same thing. Yet Hibbs uses the Monthly Labor Review figures for seven countries and the OECD data for five others.
Hibbs may believe that the OECD-ILO data are comparable for the five countries he includes. But with a question as complex as the cross-national comparability of unemployment figures, if one advocates an hypothesis, one should consider oneself a biased judge, likely to allow the needs of his hypothesis to influence one's opinion of which cases are acceptable. The use of a poor data set in its entirety has at least the defense of objectivity; the use of subjectively selected cases from such a set is more difficult to countenance. Hibbs explains this curious choice of time period in footnote 16, asking us to believe that long lags, of several decades, between party rule and macroeconomic result are implied in his formulation of hypotheses 2 and 3. While it is perhaps implausible, we might accept this contention if the author consistently adhered to it. But he does not. The latter section of the article is devoted to a time series analysis which purports to show that after the British Labour and U.S. Democratic parties take over, unemployment rates in their respective countries go down. In order to undertake that analysis at all, one has to assume that macroeconomic effects come relatively quickly. And Hibbs explicitly makes this assumption, postulating a threemonth lag between change in party control and unemployment effects. The results themselves-and Hibbs, at least, is obligated to believe them-indicate quick response times. For the British case, for example, Hibbs claims that the effect of party control on unemployment is virtually exhausted after about six quarters, that is, a year and a half, and completely exhausted in four years. It is curious indeed to see an author repudiate in one place his own findings in another.
Consistency, in fact, is not one of Hibbs' strengths. In footnote 15, just before the footnote 16 which argues for the "decades lag" interpretation of the hypotheses, Hibbs writes:
Actually 4. Hibbs does not offer an explicit operational definition for a "left-wing" political party. In practice, it appears that he depends on a semantic definition, considering the labels "Socialist," "Labor," and "Social Democrat" as being "left-wing." The policy orientations and decisions of these parties go unexamined. Thus the moderate, centrist Norwegian Labor party and Danish Social Democrats get classified as "left-wing." The American Democratic party is right-wing.
Here again Hibbs falls into inconsistency, for he contradicts his treatment in the latter part of the article. There he treats the Democrats, with "relatively close connections to organized labor and lower income and occupational status groups" as the left-wing party which allegedly lowers unemployment by 2.36 percent when it gains control of the executive.
The inconsistency can hardly be attributed to random carelessness. In the analysis concerning the cross-national hypotheses 2 and 3, it is necessary that the U.S. be zero percent "leftwing" governed if the correlations are to come out as hypothesized. As Hibbs employs it, then, the left-wing, right-wing dimension is a rubber variable, a variable so poorly defined that the same case (i.e., the U.S. Democratic party) may be placed in opposite categories at the discretion of the researcher. Hibbs' explanation for introducing the dummy variable is that in October 1966 the Labour party introduced an expanded unemployment compensation system. Hibbs argues that "the new compensation scheme increased the rate and duration of unemployment." Another contradiction. Hibbs starts out asserting and ends up claiming that the Labour party reduces unemployment. But now, to put inconvenient data in their place, he asserts the opposite: the Labour party increased unemployment. Thus Hibbs presents us with a beast which I thought, until now, was purely mythological: the rubber Readers may recall that my principal argument was that governments pursue macroeconomic policies broadly consistent with the objective economic interests and subjective preferences1 of their class-defined core political constituencies. Labor-oriented, working classbased leftist parties typically attach greater weight to full employment than price stability, whereas the reverse is generally true for middleand upper middle class-based centrist and rightist parties. Most of the article was devoted to showing that these partisan differences in economic priorities have an impact on observable macroeconomic outcomes, particularly unemployment outcomes. Let me now respond to Payne's charges. Selection of Cases. Payne implies that I selected cases (countries) that supported my arguments and excluded those that did not-a rather serious accusation. Actually, the countries appearing in my article form the empirical base of a much larger project on the political economy of Western industrial democracies, and have 1My article summarized the objective distributional consequences of and subjective preferences toward unemployment/inflation configurations. These topics are given more sustained analysis in Hibbs (1975, 1978a, 1978b 1473-75) .
In his hypotheses and the arguments
The political factors bearing on macroeconomic outcomes that I identified included:
(1) partisan differences in the political authorities' short-run manipulation of monetary and fiscal policy instruments;
(2) the postwar role of the Left in shaping institutional arrangements (principally labor market and manpower policies) designed to minimize unemployment, which are very difficult to dismantle once they are in place; (3) the Left's prior economic performance, particularly just after the Second World War when many feared the onset of another great depression, and continued emphasis on low unemployment in political discourse which generated widespread public expectations of sustained high employment and therefore constrained the behavior of all subsequent governments.
Since I argued that factors (2) The results in Table 1 Denmark also appears among the countries listed in Table 1 for the reasons mentioned previously. Table 1) .
(3) A high Left vote share, even if it does not lead to frequent outright control of the executive, may exert substantial influence on macroeconomic policies and outcomes, at least with respect to issues of great salience to the organized working class.
Of course, the correlations in Table 1 Table 2) illusions about demonstrating "iron laws." Unquestionably, the article has serious limitations. To enhance the usefulness of this exchange let me identify three that I think are particularly important.
(1) The article takes almost no account of the international economic and political constraints on macroeconomic policies and outcomes.
(2) It assumes a rather naive view of the unemployinent-inflation trade-off and makes no mention of the recent "rational expectations" mini-revolution in economic theory, which has profound implications for unemployment and inflation policy.
(3) It looks at macroeconomic outcomes rather than movements in monetary and fiscal policy instruments. Only the latter, of course, are controlled directly by political officials.
In subsequent work I have tried to make some progress on these problems. I have had distinguished company. Important recent studies by James Alt, Andrew Cowart, Heino Fassbender, Bruno Frey, Robert Gordon, and Edward Tufte, among others, have advanced the field significantly. It is with great concern that I read Norman Furniss' "The Political Implications of the Public Choice-Property Rights School" in the B. That although public choice-property rights and institutional economics should be separated analytically, the position of the latter regarding the concept of property must be spelled out in any discussion because it is the unique, and viable, alternative (that is, there are only two streams). This notion can muster little support. I refrain from quoting numerous citations from Aristotle, Locke, Marx etc., each of whom has much that is valuable to say on the concept and rights of property, and mention only current theorists. Here we find property rights an essential element in the thought of figures as diverse in their normative conclusions as Rothbard, Nozick, Buchanan, Rawls, and Macpherson. (I pick these because they happen to be discussed in a very useful paper by Lehning, 1978.) We also find well-developed political positions based on a rigorous delineation of appropriate and inappropriate property rights. The most impressive effort, I feel, has been made by a group I term "functional socialists," whose arguments can be traced to R. H. Tawney and Ernst Wigforss (see Furniss, 1978b ). Let us add that institutional economists contribute many insights into the nature of property rights as well; Lowery provides a list of references. The point, of course, is that all these cont ributions are best treated in separate papers or articles (as indeed I have done) or in a monograph detailing the implications of divergent perspectives on the concept of property. In this connection, a piece by Lowery that would argue that institutionalist economists "may contribute to our understanding of politics" might well be in order. But it is neither necessary nor relevant for me in the midst of a discussion of the political significance of the public choice-property rights school to pluck from among the myriad formulations of the concept of property those of institutional economics for sustained treatment. Unless it is claimed.... C. That although distinct from the public choice-property rights school and only one of many perspectives on property, institutional economics has so eclipsed "neoclassical" economics that (to mix metaphors) institutional economics has become a mighty river while neoclassical economics has been reduced to a small creek. In this case one might declare (as Lowery at times seems to do) not that I should have incorporated both perspectives but that I have written the wrong article. I will not belabor the obstacles facing anyone attempting to argue seriously for this proposition, as opposed to merely stating it. Fortunately, we need not investigate what might be meant by the statement that "property rights analysis as practiced by institutionalist economists brings to the center of attention the inherent relationships between structure, behavior, and performance." There is no need for invidious comparison; for our purposes it is enough to note that the importance and intellectual influence of the public choice-property rights perspective can be exaggerated only with difficulty-the pages of this Review, for example, are full of debts, both implicit and explicit, to its basic conceptual thrust. Briefly, I refer the reader to the able presentation of Ostrom (1977). See also his citations. I would be glad to provide further references.
In sum, I continue to feel that my delineation of the public choice-property rights perspective is appropriate and that my argument is potentially significant. (Since Lowery states that my "criticisms apply" to the school, his letter does not offer much opportunity to say more than this.) I conclude on a conciliatory note. Scholars working in both the traditions of public choice-property rights and institutional economics share a disdain for mere "data manipulation" and a concern for elaborating the essential issues of economic and political life. James Buchanan puts the matter very well, and it is proper that he should have the final word (1976, pp. 167, 168):
The hard questions are not readily formulated in terms of testable hypotheses. But this offers no cause for not thinking about such questions, for not discussing them, for not searching for an appreciation and understanding.... We do not "solve" the "problem" of social order by producing a unique "solution," regardless of the sophistication of empirical techniques. There is no objective "truth" to be established here. The "problem" of social order is faced eternally by persons who realize that they must live together and that to do so they
